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I. INTRODUCTION
Within 10 minutes, my gorgeous little angel would walk in for her
evening bath. She closed the door behind her, and began to undress
for her hidden audience of one. Once in the tub she was out of sight,
but as she was undressing, drying and putting on her night shirt, she
was my little vision. I gazed lovingly at the light brown skin that
covered her nearly perfect body. No body hair and slightly dark nip-
ples on her chest was just too much to take. I could not help
myself. ... '
This excerpt, from an article written by an admitted pedophile, stirs
powerful and often uncontrollable emotions in everyone. Whether the
emotions are the lust stirred in a pedophile or feelings of anger, disgust,
and repugnance felt in the rest of us, they are, unequivocally, powerful
emotions. It is undisputed that the First Amendment protects this per-
1. Anonymous, The Warrior's Story (visited Nov. 5, 1998), available in <http://
www.cyberpass.net/-plf/members/warrior.html>.
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son's right to express his or her beliefs. It is also undisputed in the
scientific community, that persons aroused by this type of eroticism suf-
fer from a personality disorder characterized as abnormal behavior.2
This type of aberrant behavior strikes deep at the heart of a community's
soul. It has served as the catalyst for the enactment and enforcement of
an array of laws designed to protect our children from the boogeyman on
the information superhighway.
This comment is not a diatribe against people who are diagnosed as
pedophiliacs. Nor is it a categorical condemnation of efforts to police the
Internet. Instead, this comment attempts a detached critical analysis of
Florida Statute 847.0135, and police enforcement activity that has
emerged since its passage.
The analysis draws from a variety of sources. The approach to this
problem cannot be one of myopic legal analysis with no medical, statis-
tical or empirical considerations. Because this problem is essentially
influenced by human behavior, the article explores the disorder most
commonly associated with sexual abuse of children - pedophilia. In
reaching conclusions, the article calls upon the most contemporary,
scholarly thoughts on the subject, as well as empirical and anecdotal
data personally collected during fifteen years of law enforcement. Most
of the anecdotal data has been developed through innumerable contacts
on the Internet in an investigative role, and for obvious reasons requires
the appropriate level of skepticism.
The decision to explore this problem solidified as I came to ques-
tion the efficacy of society's own activities. The result of challenging
my own convictions is the comment that follows. While the analysis has
assuaged my concerns somewhat, the underlying current of concern still
flows swiftly.
My approach to this problem is from both an academic and a
clinical perspective. In the context of purely academic profundity,
police conduct is often dissected with the kind of surgical accuracy that
only 20/20 hindsight and the leisure of extended deliberation can pro-
vide. It is my goal to conduct this type of analysis, juxtaposed against
the type of "real-world" functionality that police officers and prosecu-
tors must grapple with daily. The result, I hope, is a salient, practical
examination that is of value to both academicians and practitioners.
The analysis occurs in several steps. First, a frank and thorough
examination of the logistical "nuts and bolts" of police investigations in
this realm is offered. After an introduction to the inner workings of
police on-line investigations, I begin to examine the problems raised by
2. See DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 302.20 (3d ed. 1987).
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the anonymous nature of cyberspace and the influence of psychological
deviance. Because the world of cyberspace is wrought with fantasy and
role playing, it is very difficult to punish what society perceives to be
criminal conduct under the law without coming dangerously close to
punishing "guilty thoughts." This fact, combined with serious entrap-
ment concerns, must be addressed if we are to successfully and legally
protect our children. To solve the problems addressed in the comment, I
offer an amendment to existing law. This amendment provides height-
ened protection from punishment of innocent conduct, yet it allows pre-
vention of criminal conduct that actually threatens our youth. Through
this analysis it may be seen that protection of children from on-line
pedophiles is both a necessary expenditure of law enforcement resources
and legally possible within the confines of our existing system of
jurisprudence.
II. THE ANATOMY OF A POLICE INVESTIGATION
Most police investigations evolve along one of two paths, proactive
or reactive. Proactive policing is a strategy of investigating crimes
before they occur.3  Reactive investigations refer to the customary
detective work carried on only after a crime has occurred.4 Historically,
reactive policing has been the favored method. In the early 1800s,
throughout England and the United States, the lack of a professional
police force necessitated using private investigators to recover property
and to deliver criminals for trial.5 Beginning with the 1829 reform
movement in England, orchestrated by Sir Robert Peel, policing eventu-
ally became an organized professional enterprise.6 During this era,
proactive methods of investigation were largely held in disrepute.7
Proactive methods were rejected over reactive investigative tech-
niques, due in large part to the extremely close resemblance of the inves-
tigative conduct to fraud, misrepresentation, and extortion.
Additionally, with the advent of Scotland Yard and the burst of scientific
and technological advances such as fingerprinting, microscopic exami-
nation, and record keeping, English criminal investigators all but aban-
doned the use of proactive techniques.8 In America, the march toward
professional unified police forces was even less rapid than in England.9
3. See BARTON L. INGRAHAM & THOMAS P. MAURIELLO, POLICE INVESTIGATION HANDBOOK
5-1 (1990).
4. See id. at 5-2.
5. See id. at 5-12.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 5-15.
9. See id.
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Throughout this time both methods of investigation were used, but the
reactive method was favored for all of the above reasons.
Over time, the criminal justice system has gradually recognized that
effective management of the police investigative function requires the
integration of both methods. It has become apparent that reactive tech-
niques are ill-suited to the investigation of some types of crimes, in par-
ticular, vice crimes and those crimes of an organized nature. As we
begin to explore the world of the pedophile, it becomes clear that the use
of proactive techniques are well suited because of the high incidence of
under - or non-reporting by victims. Because the victim is reluctant
and hard to identify, few, if any, cases may be investigated after the fact.
Additionally, pedophilic molestation of children falls into a class of
crimes against which society categorically wishes to guard. It is a crime
we seek to prevent at all costs. It is true that societies seek to prevent all
types of crime. Even opponents to police activity in this area, however
must admit that investigating the sexual exploitation of a child is rather
like closing the barn after the horse has already left. The damage society
seeks to reduce is the psychological and emotional trauma to the victim.
Clearly, limiting our investigation of these crimes only to reactive inves-
tigation of pedophilic encounters would be a gross disservice to our chil-
dren. A stolen television may be recovered after the fact in substantially
the same condition as when stolen. The same cannot be said of a
molested child's emotional condition. For this reason, proactive investi-
gative techniques are valuable tools in helping to curb this type of crime.
A more adequate understanding of the unique nature of conducting
investigations on-line requires a basic working knowledge of the com-
puter and computer communications. With limited exception, all pres-
ent-day investigations of on-line activity are conducted using the
Internet. Not long ago, the Internet was practically nonexistent. Before
the burgeoning growth of the Internet, on-line law enforcement activity,
the little that existed confined itself to local computer systems called
Bulletin Boards Systems (BBS).10
In 1957, the USSR launched Sputnik prompting the United States
Department of Defense to sponsor the Advanced Research Project
Agency (ARPA) - the progenitor of the Internet.Il Under the auspices
of the Department of Defense, computers on various military posts were
linked through this new communications protocol. The goal of this pro-
10. A Bulletin Board System is a computer, or series of computers linked together, into which
a user may call directly from his computer. A BBS is distinguished from the Internet in that the
Internet is a series of computers virtually linked together forming a "web" of machines.




ject was total interconnectivity among military installations. Eventu-
ally, the network, originally called ARPANET, was expanded to include
academic and research institutions. This network underwent drastic
change over its lifetime, and it eventually became known as the Internet.
The Internet is essentially the physical backbone of interconnected com-
puters over which the World Wide Web (WWW) is constructed.' 2 In
1993, the WWW had an estimated 130 sites. As of December 1998, less
than seven years later, the web has grown to approximately 3,689,227
sites.' 3 This rapid rate of expansion of a communications medium is
unparalleled in history, and it is expected to continue.
When police initiate undercover operations on the Internet, it is
most frequently done through a concept known as Internet Relay Chat
(IRC). To do this, the investigator must first have Internet access.
Access to the Internet is obtained through an Internet Service Provider
(ISP). ISP's are located everywhere-literally. They range from small
"mom-and-pop" type operations, to commercial giants. An ISP gener-
ally provides a subscribing user with access to a private account through
which the user may reach the Internet, one or more electronic mail
accounts (e-mail), and usually a small portion of computer storage space
on the system in which the subscriber may construct a home page."
Larger ISPs often have chat areas and discussion groups available for
on-line discussions between co-subscribers. The two most popular, and
arguably the largest, ISPs are Compuserve and America Online (AOL).
In some cases, subscribers will be given an account on the ISP called a
"shell" account, which gives the subscriber the ability to access actual
time on the system processor. These accounts are very popular with
clandestine "hacker' 15 groups because they usually provide access to the
ISP's UNIX 6 shell directories.
A unique feature of smaller ISPs is that they may accept a sub-
scriber's information without verification. This means that criminals
and law enforcement alike can obtain an ISP account under a false name
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. A home page is a virtual presence on the WWW upon which the owner can place text,
images, video clips, or music files.
15. Hacker is a term frequently used to describe both a computer afficionado who dedicates
large amounts of time and energy to the legal use of computers and a computer criminal who
commits acts of unauthorized access to computer systems. In the context of this article the term
hacker will be used only to denote the latter, not the former.
16. UNIX is a high-level computer programming language created by Bell Laboratories in the
late 1960's. It is essentially the language of choice on large mainframe computers, and is usually
the underlying operating system on most ISP sites. The hackers who consider themselves among
the "elite" will use shell access to write and run clandestine hacking programs. The shell account
is a good launching place for clandestine attacks on other computers.
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and address. This can prove to be both a benefit and bane to law
enforcement. Once an ISP account is obtained, the undercover work can
begin.
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is a computer program that permits two-
or-more users to conduct live (real-time), typed conversations. IRC is
run through a virtual network of servers into which the user logs using a
computer program called a client. Two popular client programs are
MIRC and PIRCH, running under the Windows computer environment.
These client programs create "windows" in which text may be typed and
read simultaneously, creating a two-way, instantaneous written conver-
sation between multiple people located anywhere in the world. Depend-
ing upon the sophistication of both the client program and the computer
user, enhancements such as live video conferencing and file sharing are
not only possible, but no more than a mouse-click away. After being
logged on, a nickname is selected so that the user can be contacted by
other users.
17
The choice of nicknames is frequently of considerable importance.
Most users of IRC select a descriptive nickname germane to the user's
purpose or personality. Users are often limited in their name selection
only by the simultaneous existence of the same name. In other words,
no two users may simultaneously log on with the same name. A service
called "NickServ" first will warn the second user attempting to use the
same name and, then, if the warning goes unheeded, will automatically
rename the user. On one particular server, "UNDERNET," the server
maintains a registry of nicknames. Through this registry, a user may
sign up for a specific nickname, provided it is not already in use, and
then keep the nickname for his own use from session to session. Gener-
ally speaking however, most servers do not store nicknames from ses-
sion to session, and they are issued on a first come first served basis.
Because IRC is largely self-regulated, there are few restrictions
placed on the choice of nicknames people may choose. Examples of
acceptable nicknames are HARD4U and Bi-Fem-Amanda. 18 Each con-
veys a very specific message. After selecting a login name you may
either enter a pre-existing channel 19 or create your own. With the
exception of several server-run channels, a user can create any channel
they wish. A typical example of a channel name is
"!!!00000dads&daughtersex." Within the channel users, can chat in
17. This process is somewhat analogous to the CB radio.
18. These nicknames have been taken from actual users seen during on-line investigative
sessions by the author.
19. A channel is a specific area within the server and is usually dedicated to specific topics.
Depending upon the day and time, there may be any number of active channels on a server.
During the author's most recent log-on session, Dal-net contained over 9,000 individual channels.
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"public" mode where all members of the channel can see the conversa-
tion, or two users can chat in private mode, where they are the only two
users that can see the conversation. This is often called whisper mode
and is analogous to a two-party telephone call. With the exception of a
few server-moderated channels, all channels on the servers are user-
moderated, and anything goes. Because of this, IRC channels can be
distinguished from services such as AOL and Compuserve, where most
forums and discussion groups are server-moderated and conversations
are frequently monitored. Because of this uncontrolled and unregulated
atmosphere, the realm of IRC has been referred to by law enforcement
as "cowboy country."2 This is the new frontier where practically any-
thing goes. This area is where most law enforcement activity originates
and is largely unregulated and uncontrolled.
The next step in the investigation is dictated by the manner in
which the police receive the information. If the police receive a com-
plaint from a user or an ISP, targeting has already been done. In this
situation the undercover officer is armed with a nickname and usually a
channel the target frequents. At the very least the police have an e-mail
address. With these pieces of information it is a simple matter of enter-
ing the chat room and looking for that person. If complaints about a
channel have been received, but not about a particular individual, then
an "open trolling" operation begins.2" In either case, the "bait" used to
lure the target is the undercover nickname. As discussed earlier, the
choice of nicknames is frequently very descriptive. Most often, as an
undercover officer, the choice is obvious. When looking for a
pedophile, assume the personal characteristics of a young user, either
male or female depending upon the target. A common tactic among
investigators is to suffix the descriptive name with an age. Rachel-12 is
quite common, as are other variations on that theme. The plan of attack
is simple. Sit and wait - usually not for long. It has been my experi-
ence as an investigator that when using a female sounding name and a
youthful persona, so many requests for private chat occur within five
minutes that immediate response to all would be impossible.
Invariably the first question asked by "Ken forboys" or
"Dad 4 daughter," is A/S/L, which is computer chat room short-hand
for age, sex, and location. The normal response to that question is your
assumed age, sex, and where you are calling from. In my estimation, in
20. Videotape: Computer Crime Seminar (Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association Nov. 3,
1998) (on file with Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association) [hereinafter Computer Crime
Seminar].
21. This is a term used in law enforcement parlance, of which the derivation is unknown to
the author. It is believed to refer to a fishing technique of sending out a baited hook and waiting
for a fish strike.
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approximately eight out of ten encounters on-line, the target asks for a
photograph within the first five minutes of conversation. In my experi-
ence, getting a picture is the goal of the conversation. There are many
collectors of photographs who make contact with someone on-line sim-
ply to add to their collection of images. If the undercover officer does
not provide a picture, the conversation is usually terminated. When ask-
ing for a picture, the target is usually referring to a picture of the child
with whom he believes he is talking. If this is unsuccessful, the target
may ask for any pictures that the person may have collected. It must be
kept in mind that at this stage, the target is not actually asking for the
exchange of child pornography. The target is merely asking for a per-
sonal picture of the child - a legal request.
Because so many responses occur in a short period of time, the
investigator must prioritize targets. This process is generally not capable
of description, it is a learned art that I analogize to the ability of a car
salesman to sort out the "lookie-loos" from the "real" customers. It is
developed only after compiling hours of on-line experience, is an inex-
act science, and is frequently wrong. Many times I have relied upon gut
instinct and experience, only to find that the target was merely interested
in a brief on-line encounter, not a face-to-face meeting.
In the prioritization stage, it is essential that the investigator make
no reference to anything sexual. Because entrapment in any undercover
operation is an ever-present concern, inducement must be minimized.
Conversations generally begin with very benign topics such as school,
hobbies, and home life. It is helpful to assume an identity of some
naivete. This allows for the deflection of difficult sexually-oriented
questions without arousing the suspicions of the target.
Once the target has been selected, or perhaps more appropriately,
has selected you, email addresses are usually exchanged. While chat-
ting, sophisticated software programs are used to identify the target's
ISP. These programs, such as "Netlab" and "Neotrace," operate unde-
tected by the target.2 This check provides the undercover officer with a
series of numbers known as an Internet Protocol (IP) address. 23
Each computer on the Internet, and every computer on local net-
works for that matter, is assigned a unique IP address. Without this
series of numbers, the electronic traffic on the Internet would not reach
the appropriate destination. The IP address is essentially a unique physi-
22. Undercover officers' ISPs may also be obtained by the target; therefore, as in all
undercover operations, during the choice of a cover story it is imperative that the story match with
any information the target may obtain through the ISP.




cal address assigned to each computer that identifies it in the Internet
world. This address is associated with a domain name using many of the
same programs the officer used to obtain the IP address.24 Armed with a
domain name or IP address, the undercover officer then retrieves the
information necessary to serve the ISP with a subpoena for records.
As part of the protocol of the Internet, all domain names are
required to be registered with a service known as the InterNic. This
service maintains an accurate and current database of the relations
between IP addresses and the computer to which they are assigned. A
simple query of the database provides the officer with a complete name
and address for the person in charge of the domain name.
ISPs have become necessary because not every household com-
puter has a permanent connection to the Internet. If every computer on
the Internet was directly connected, then every computer in every home,
university, or business would have a unique IP address. Because this is
not the case, ISPs are often assigned several IP addresses. Under this
configuration, ISP subscribers call into the bank of telephone lines
owned by the ISP and are then "routed" to the Internet using the IP
addresses assigned to the ISP. This dynamic system of IP assignment
makes it possible for worldwide access to the Internet without having to
have static IP addresses for every computer in the world.
This system also makes it more difficult to identify the target of an
investigation. Obviously, if every computer on the Internet had its own
address, InterNic would provide a specific user on every query. Because
that is not the case, InterNic often provides only the information about
the ISP, including the administrative contact for the provider, address
and telephone number. Because a large provider may have hundreds or
even thousands of simultaneous users logging in and "leap frogging"
onto the Internet, a single IP address cannot discretely identify the target
of the investigation. This is where the service of legal process becomes
necessary.
Procedures vary from state to state. In Florida, the information
sought may be released through the use of a State Attorney's investiga-
tive subpoena. 25 Through the subpoenaed information, the target's name
and address are learned.26 Usually each ISP maintains an access log.
This access log identifies the users logged into the system at every sec-
24. Domain Name is a mnemonic used to represent textually the difficult-to-remember series
of numbers. An example of a domain name is Microsoft.com. It is merely shorthand notation for
humans.
25. See FLA. STAT. ch. 934.02 (1997).
26. The ISP processes only that information required for a user to obtain an account. If no
verification is done by them, then the user's information will more than likely be false. Most do,
however, maintain a record of the incoming calls through an Automated Number Identifier (ANI).
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ond of every day. From this information it is possible, although diffi-
cult, to identify which user was dynamically assigned to which IP
address. By matching the exact date and time of the on-line encounter
with the records of the ISP, it is often possible to identify the user
account from which the conversation originated.
The pursuit does not stop there. Many ISPs maintain a database
compiled from their ANI system. The ISP can, and usually does, iden-
tify the specific telephone line from which the login call was placed.
This ANI data is critical to the next step in the investigation.
The goal of the investigation is to arrange for a face-to-face meet-
ing between the target and the child. The semantics of how this is
accomplished are tricky. Most often, when the target suggests a meet-
ing, he suggests that the undercover travel to his location. Because of
jurisdictional and cost concerns, the preferred arrangement is for the tar-
get to meet at the undercover's location. This arrangement gives the
police much more control over the meeting environment, providing for a
safer arrest with less chance of injury to the defendant, an officer, or an
innocent bystander. This arrangement also helps reduce the cost and
logistical problems of traveling to a remote meeting site. When the tar-
get agrees to this, it is frequently called a traveler case.27
Similar to narcotics investigations, the undercover officer places a
telephone call to the target and completes the arrangements for the meet-
ing on the telephone. The telephone calls are treated no differently than
recorded telephone calls placed for narcotics, gambling or any other
undercover operation. In Florida, the recording of telephone calls
between targets of a criminal investigation and a police undercover
officer is permitted.28 In fact, the recordings are powerful evidence of
the target's willingness to engage in sexual acts, knowledge of the par-
lance of the criminal conduct and as well help to establish the target's
belief that the undercover is a child.29
The final phase of the investigation is dictated mostly by the path
the target chooses. As stated earlier, the goal of the investigation is the
arrangement of a face-to-face meeting between the target and the under-
cover officer. By arranging this meeting, two issues are resolved. First,
An ANI is similar to caller-id and will provide the telephone number from which the user called.
From that the phone company can provide the rest.
27. See Computer Crime Seminar, supra note 20.
28. See FLA. STAT. ch. 933 (1997).
29. For obvious reasons, the telephone calls are often placed by officers other than the
undercover. For example, a particular female officer, whose voice readily passes for that of a 14-
year-old-girl, places the call. Her assistance enables the target to openly discuss, on tape, the
various sexual acts that she will be asked to perform. This also removes many aspects of the "role
play" problem. See infra Part Ill.
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the identity of the offender is established, and second, the offender's true
intentions are readily known. For example, in one particular Florida
case, the offender arranged for a meeting with one he believed to be a
child he had met on the Internet for the purpose of engaging in a sexual
act.30 If the offender arrives at the meeting place, it corroborates the
defendant's intention to commit sexual acts with a child. Depending
upon the approach taken by the offender and the circumstances per-
ceived by investigators, an alternative strategy is to obtain a search
warrant.
Based upon the officer's investigation and the identification pro-
vided by the ISP, search warrants for the suspect's residence and com-
puter are obtained and executed. The actual manner in which the search
warrant is executed may be of key importance in these cases.
As previously indicated, it is essential that the offender is positively
identified as the person with whom messages have been exchanged.
Without the benefit of a face-to-face meeting, it may be impossible to
put the offender "behind-the-keyboard," and thus prove he is in fact the
same person. It is conceivable, and well within the range of reasonable
doubt, that a person other than the genuine account holder, or telephone
subscriber, could have been using the computer during the on-line con-
versations. It is possible to reduce this doubt by timing the search war-
rant execution to coincide with the offender's on-line chat session. After
obtaining the warrant, the undercover officer makes contact with the
offender on-line, and begins chatting. The police then execute the war-
rant while the suspect is on-line chatting with the undercover officer.
This allows the police to document that the person with whom the
undercover is conversing is in fact the subject arrested.31
Even in traveler cases, a secondary goal of the investigation is to
obtain and execute a search warrant on the target's personal computer.
This is routinely done where the evidence supports it, and physical con-
straints allow. In my experience, offending pedophiles who go to the
difficulty and risk of meeting with a child will possess child pornogra-
phy, contact lists, and documentation of other meetings or other like-
minded computer users. All these items, when seized legally, provide
powerful evidence of the criminal act.
30. See State v. Duke, 709 So.2d. 580 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1998).
31. This method poses the risk of the offender being able to delete information, or erase files
at the time the warrant is being executed. For this reason, some agencies dislike this method in
some situations.
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
III. THE TARGET
A. Know Your Enemy: Understanding the Pedophile Offender
In the struggle to reconcile the need for effective, efficient enforce-
ment and prevention of child sexual abuses with the legal issues raised
by the Internet phenomenon of chat rooms and pedophile solicitors, this
article explores both the scientific definition of the disorder known as
pedophilia, and empirical data of admitted pedophiles. This data has
been collected in the hope that the methodologies in use by law enforce-
ment can be reconciled with the requirement of fair and just
adjudication.
The sexual predator addressed by section 847.0135, Florida Stat-
utes, is commonly referred to by various names, ranging from pedophile
to child molester, but all are characterized by one common denominator
- the unnatural sexual attraction to children. Not all sexual predators
are pedophiles, and not all pedophiles are sexual predators. Pedophilia,
a specific medical diagnosis, 32 is often thrown about with reckless aban-
don when discussing this particular type of sex offender. The true diag-
nosis of pedophilia falls into a class of disorders known as paraphilias
and include such disorders as travestitism, exhibitionism, and sadism.
There are two distinctly different sub-groupings within the
paraphilic subclassification of pedophilia. The classic pedophile, whose
desire for sexual contact is directed at prepubertal children, and
hebophiles, whose sexual interests run toward postpubertal children. Of
the two, the pedophilic sex offender is most often the offender with the
lowest rate of rehabilitation. 33 Conversely, the hebophile has a compar-
atively higher rate of rehabilitation.34 In the clinical context, offenders
in the hebophilic category may be referred to as child molesters instead
of pedophiles. Both offenders, however, are characterized by an abnor-
mal affinity for youthful sexual partners.35 To be clinically diagnosed as
suffering from pedophilia, an offender must meet the criteria established
by The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. A diag-
nosed pedophile has 1) an impairment that lasts at least six months, with
recurrent and "intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors" that involve sexual activity with a prepubescent child or chil-
dren (generally 13 years old or younger); 2) "fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors [that] cause clinically significant distress or impairment in
32. See MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1570 (Robert Berkow, M.D. ed., 16th
ed. 1992) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL].
33. See WILLIAM E. PRENDERGAST, TREATING SEX OFFENDERS IN CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND OUTPATIENT CLINICS: A GUIDE TO CLINICAL PRACTICE 140-42 (1991).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 137.
[Vol. 54:405
CYBERPREDATORS
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning"; and, 3) the
impaired person is at least aged 16 years, and at least five years older
than the child or children.36
From this definition it is easy to see that not every on-line sexual
predator can be easily categorized as a pedophile. If that is true, then
with whom are we really dealing while we are on-line.
A number of on-line sites claim to cater to the prurient interests of
pedophiles and advocate the freedom to associate with, and love anyone
of your choosing. These sites range from the web site of the National
Man-Boy Love Association (NAMBLA)37, to the Pedophile Liberation
Front (PLF).3 s The PLF site is broken down into four sections with each
dedicated to individual areas of interest, including hyperlinks39 to other
pedophile-oriented pages, alleged letters of support from former child-
lovers of pedophiles, and pages contributed by members of the PLF.
According to the PLF site:
[o]ne of the basic standpoints of the PLF is that sex is not harmful to
children in itself. We believe that any harm happening to children in
consequence of sexual activity with other children or with adults is
caused by society's reaction to such behaviour [sic]. It is the guilt
and taboo associated with children's sexuality (and with sexuality in
general) that may cause psychological troubles to sexuate children.4"
The PLF also takes a stance on the issue of child pornography. It
feels that child pornography is no different from any other kind of por-
nography and that children are not victimized. They are simply
encouraged to participate willingly.4" On the whole, the web site is a
conglomeration of "don't hate us, were not bad people" rhetoric with a
dash of "allow me to educate you as to why you are wrong and we are
right" hyperbole. The site advocates healthy sexual experimentation,
decries forced sexual intercourse with children, and calls for the recogni-
tion of pedophilia as being no different or less acceptable than homosex-
uality or heterosexuality.
Of the articles found on the site, one is interesting enough to dis-
cuss further. The article is entitled, A Different Kind of Sexuality What
36. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 527-28 (4th ed.
1994).
37. North American Man-Boy Love Association (visited Nov. 5, 1998), available in <http:II
www.nambla.org>.
38. Pedophile Liberation Front (visited Nov. 5, 1998), available in <http://
www.cyberpass.net/-plf/home.html>.
39. Hyperlinks are highlighted areas of text within a web page, that when clicked upon, will
immediately take the reader to a new page or site.
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"Real" Adults Cannot Understand. The author of this article, for obvi-
ous reasons, has chosen to use a pseudonym. This article, while very
startling, attempts to define a rudimentary difference between pedophilic
sexual attractions and normal non-pedophilic attractions.42 The author
admits to the inability to relate sexually with adult women, and he
explains this behavior as having to do with an adult woman's greater
demand for sexual closure - the need to see the sexual act through to
the end.43 Children and pedophiles, however, are more attuned to the
feelings involved, and they will not pressure a partner to continue with
the sexual act. The on-line author claims that, in fact, the pedophile is
just as content to stop all sexual exploration with a child, and turn his
attention elsewhere." The impression given, and surely intended, by the
on-line author is that pedophilic sexuality is somehow better, more car-
ing, and more focused on feelings than non-pedophilic sexuality.
Reading the articles, manifestos, and short stories contained within
the pages of this web site creates a mental picture of the pedophilic
offender. This picture, however, is quite unlike the group of offenders
found on-line. A few persons with whom I have engaged in conversa-
tion on-line exhibited traits similar to those espoused by the PLF. The
majority, however, were much less emotionally attached, and more sex-
ual gratification oriented. If the on-line authors of the articles truly
adhere to their manifesto, the sexual contact with the child would be
secondary to the conversational aspect of companionship. This is not
primarily the case in real life. This finding begs the question, are those
persons with whom on-line chats are occurring real pedophiles and the
PLF rhetoric is merely public relations hype, or, are the on-line conver-
sations occurring with sexual offenders who are not truly pedophilic
offenders. Unfortunately, insufficient research data has been compiled
to provide a reliable answer. A plausible explanation, however, does
emerge.
According to William Prendergast, a distinction may be drawn
between pedophiles and hebophiles.45 Pedophiles prefer prepubescent
children, and hebophiles prefer postpubescent children. The stories and
articles on the web site seem to exclusively address prepubescent attrac-
tion. On-line, however, a preponderance of the persons encountered are
interested in children between thirteen and fifteen. This age range
clearly encompasses postpubescent children and raises the plausible con-
42. The author makes no claims as to the psychological authenticity of the article's author's
assertions about pedophilic behavior.
43. See Pedophile Liberation Front, supra note 38, available in <http://www.cyberpass.netl
-plf/fft/diffsex.html>.
44. See id.
45. See PRENDERGAST, supra note 33.
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clusion that when a child is described on-line as a postpubescent adoles-
cent - between the ages of thirteen and fifteen - the dynamic of the
entire conversation changes. This explanation accounts for the differ-
ence between the behavior of the PLF subjects and those actually
encountered. Accordingly, this conclusion may sufficiently explain the
differences observed between the self-proclaimed tendencies of the PLF
supporters and actual on-line contacts.
If investigative targets are in fact pedophiles, what predisposes
them to congregate on-line? A number of factors combine to make the
on-line world an exceptionally attractive venue for pedophiles to prowl.
Studies indicate that pedophiles have an active sexual fantasy life com-
posed mainly of sexual encounters with children.46 A pedophile may
seek relief from the internal discord created by his47 overwhelming
desire to have sexual contact with a child, and his recognition that there
are severe consequences to his actions, by self-gratification.4 8 This
cycle of erotic cravings and fantasy coupled with masturbatory gratifica-
tion reinforces the pedophile's need for contact with childlike partners.49
This vicious cycle of deviant fantasy and reward-based reinforcement
intensifies the offender's desires, until almost every erection and ejacu-
lation must be accompanied by a deviant fantasy.5 ° The strength of
these fantasies has been characterized as irresistible.51 The non offend-
ing pedophile, trapped beneath the weight of his own repressed deviant
behavior and unable to quell the deviant urges within him, naturally
turns to the anonymity of the Internet for solace.
Research clearly indicates that pedophilic males tend to become
aroused while listening to audio-taped depictions of sexual activity with
children." The predominant research also adheres to the previously dis-
cussed cycle of stimulus and response. As the cycle repeats more fre-
quently, arousal will be reinforced more strongly; 51 therefore, sexual
fantasies of pedophiliac sex offenders play both a causal and mainte-
nance role. Studies of sexual deviants have found that the majority
46. See Fred S. Berlin, Sex Offenders: A Biomedical Perspective and a Status report on
Biomedical Treatment, in THE SExuAL AGGRESSOR 83 (Joanne G. Greer & Irving R. Stuart eds.,
1983).
47. See id. Pedophilia is almost exclusively a disorder afflicting males.
48. See id. at 85.
49. See id. at 88.
50. See Paul A. Walker et al., Antiandrogenic Treatment of the Paraphilias, in GUIDELINES
FOR THE USE OF PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS 427, 429 (Harvey C. Stancer et al. eds., 1984).
51. See BERLIN, supra note 46, at 88.
52. See Constance A. Avery-Clark & D. R. Laws, Differential Erection Response Patterns of
Sexual Abusers to Stimuli Describing Activities with Children, 15 BEHAV. THERAPY (1984).
53. See D. R. Laws & W. L. Marshall, A Conditioning Theory of the Etiology and
Maintenance of Deviant Sexual Preference and Behaviour, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT:
THEORIES AND TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER 209-29, (H.E. Barbaree et al. eds., 1990).
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
reported masturbating to deviant fantasies based upon the deviation of
their preference. 4 Hence, an environment renown for its fantasy-like
qualities lends itself quite well to the deviant fantasies of pedophiliacs.
This fantasy-release continuum appears to be a benign way to control
deviant behavior. Research suggests however, that if this cycle continues
to self-perpetuate, eventually the fantastic behavior is no longer satisfac-
tory, and the pedophile must resort to more tactile stimulation. This
segue from fantasy to reality may very well be the bridge between the
debatably harmless role player and the predisposed child sex offender.
Because not all pedophiliacs assault children, they should be
divided into two categories - non offending pedophiles and offending
pedophiles. It is well established that a non-offending pedophile is
guilty of no crime. 5 Conversely, the offending pedophile is subject to
liability for any statute his conduct violates. Both the offending and non
offending pedophiles may use the Internet for legitimate, non-criminal
purposes as well as the currently criminal end of child solicitation. For
this reason - the inability to distinguish harmful solicitation from mere
fantasy release - proponents of strict regulation of solicitation crimes
advocate strong enforcement efforts. Under the foregoing rationale,
non-offending pedophiles who engage in fantasy role play on the
Internet are distinguishable from their offending counterpart by the
absence of any solicitation activity. Generally, perhaps this is true.
Consider, however, the non offending pedophile, whose fantasy
role playing involves a clandestine meeting with a thirteen-year-old. In
"playing out" this fantasy on the Internet during an on-line chat session,
the pedophile discusses the particulars of the meeting, including the var-
ious sexual acts that the child would be expected to perform. We can
assume, arguendo, that the pedophile is non offending and has no real
intention of carrying out the meeting or sexual contact. In this scenario,
the offender may be guilty of a crime under some laws even though his
conduct extended no further than mere guilty thoughts. In this unusual
but plausible scenario, the non offending pedophile's fantasy mechanism
produces results nearly identical to those of the offending pedophile who
arranges for a meeting but simply fails to show. Both are liable under
the language of the law; however, only one ever intended to engage in
the underlying conduct we truly wish to prevent.
54. See R.J. McGuire et al., Sexual Deviation as Conditioned Behaviour: A Hypothesis,
BEHAV. RES. AND THERAPY 2, 1965 at 185.
55. See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (finding status crimes violative




A. Fear Spurs Action
It is clear from the collected data that pedophiles are present on the
Internet in and out of chat rooms. The media has reported this Internet
presence frequently and zealously. 6 These harbingers prophesize about
a time when no child will be safe in cyberspace from the evil that lurks
behind every chat room door. This media onslaught is not new, but leg-
islators bent on singlehandedly making our "cyberstreets" safe once
again are watching very closely. The Alabama Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee passed a bill based upon the perceived threat to children from
Internet pedophiles.5 7 Republican Bill Armistead referred to recent
newspaper articles in support of his call for the new legislation. 8 In
Boston, Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger pleaded for
stronger legislation making solicitation of children on-line a criminal act
in itself. 9 Fear of on-line predators has led to more than one state's
passage of legislation criminalizing the Internet solicitation of children.
This public fear of on-line sexual predators influenced the passage, and
subsequent amendment of a computer pornography statute in Florida.
B. Florida Statute 8470135
Florida law enforcement officials prosecute most Internet activities
of this nature under section 847.0135 - the Computer Pornography and
Child Exploitation Prevention Act of 1986.60 In particular, subsection
three prohibits the use of computer on-line services for the purpose of
soliciting a child to commit a sexual act.61 This section has prompted
police to pursue cases of Internet solicitation. The popularity of these
cases has become so great that the Florida Department of Law Enforce-
ment (FDLE) now has specific investigative agents assigned to conduct
these type of investigations.62
The legislature passed this statute in 1986 as part of Florida's anti-
computer pornography and child exploitation effort; however, it went
largely unnoticed until 1996. The original statute was not drafted with
the language necessary to address the solicitation cases now routinely
56. See David Rosenzweig, Man Sentenced for Internet Child Sex Solicitation, L.A. TmEas,
Sept. 19, 1998, at B3.
57. See Bill Seeks to Crack Down on Child Sex Solicitations on Internet, AssocIraTM PRESs,
Mar. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2512012.
58. See id.
59. Legislation Being Drafted to Stop On-line Sexual Predators, AssOCIATED PRESS, Mar.
24,1998, available in 1997 WL 7399054.
60. See FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 (1997).
61. See FLA. STAT. § 847.0135(3).
62. See Computer Crime Seminar, supra note 20.
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prosecuted under the statute.63 In 1996, the Florida legislature amended
the statute to criminalize the mere solicitation of a child for sexual con-
tact through on-line services. 64 Deterrence of the perceived threat of
lecherous "dirty-old-men" prowling the Internet in search of prey moti-
vated legislators to add section three of the statute. The most substantial
changes to the law occurred with the addition of sections three through
five.65 Section three contains the substantive language upon which
most, if not all, Internet solicitation cases are predicated.
Section three provides: "Any person who knowingly utilizes a com-
puter on-line service, Internet service, or local bulletin board service to
seduce, solicit, lure, or entice, or attempt to seduce, solicit, lure, or
entice, a child or another person believed by the person to be a child"
into any sexual act, whether sexual battery, lewdness or indecent expo-
sure, is guilty of a third degree felony.66 The sweeping breadth of the
language alone causes concern about the scope of this law's power.
As a parent, laws that provide assistance in protecting our children
will always be well received. Popular laws, however, are not always
just laws. Looking critically at the statute, two interrelated problems
emerge. The section contains essentially three distinct elements: (1) the
conduct element of using the computer to solicit; (2) the attendant cir-
cumstance that the person solicited is a child; and (3) the acts to be
committed are one of several related sexual activities. These elements
contain language making them broad and powerful tools, but in some
circumstances they may overextend the ability of law enforcement to
bring citizens into the purview of the courts.
V. THE PROBLEMS
A. Double-Inchoate Crimes
The conduct element requires the actus reus of solicitation. "[T]he
solicitation is complete the instant the actor communicates the solicita-
tion .... 67 No further overt acts are necessary. While the efficacy of
punishment for such inchoate crimes is open to debate, the punishment
of solicitations is a legitimate exercise of legislative power.
The second clause of section three compounds the inherent
problems of liability for inchoate offenses. Strict grammatical analysis
of the sentence reveals that the word "attempt" modifies the phrase "to
63. See FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 (1986).
64. See 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-338, sec. 70 §3 (Amending FLA. STAT. 847.0135 (1986)).
65. See 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-338, sec. 70 §§ 3-5.
66. FLA. STAT. ch. § 847.0135(3) (1997).
67. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 28.01[A][3] (2d ed. 1995).
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seduce, solicit, lure, or entice...,"6 This language makes it not only a
crime to solicit, but also a crime to attempt to solicit-a double inchoate
crime.
The crime of solicitation itself is a specific intent crime.69 "A per-
son cannot be guilty of solicitation unless he intentionally commits the
actus reus of the" solicitation offense and intends the result for which he
solicited participation.7 ° Here the actus reus is the knowing use of a
computer on-line service to entice or encourage a child to commit one of
the enumerated acts.
The premise underlying the punishment of inchoate crimes like
solicitation and conspiracy is that special dangers of group criminality
exist where two people unite to commit an offense. The whole is more
dangerous than its individual components.71 Under this theory, the point
at which criminality attaches to conduct moves further back in time. It
is well established in American law that "[t]he reach of the criminal law
has long been limited by the principle that no one is punishable for his
thoughts."72 Since the ability to know what another human being is
thinking is so limited, one cannot accurately reconstruct the thoughts of
another to prove any criminality.73 Closely allied with this concept is
the concern that there is no way to determine where fantasy or
daydreams end and desires of fixed intention that pose a real danger to
society begin.74 Society hesitates to punish mere guilty thoughts
because the use of our criminal law should be reserved for those
instances where society is truly threatened with harm.75 The individual
liberties of our citizens are valuable; we must carefully tread upon them,
limiting our encroachment only to conduct, not thoughts.76 Placing
thoughts at the far left edge of the criminality spectrum and voluntary
criminal acts, or the actus reus of a substantive offense, at the far right,
society can construct a model with which to think. This model illus-
trates the difficulty posed as criminality of conduct shifts.
In the case of conspiracy, illegality is positioned only slightly to the
left of the right edge of the spectrum. This shift to the left, away from
acts and toward thoughts, clearly encroaches into the area of "guilty
thoughts." Society accepts this position, but out of fear that concert of
68. FLA. STAT. § 847.0135(3) (1997).
69. See DRESSLER, supra note 67, at §28.01[A][2].
70. Id.
71. See id. at §29.03[B].
72. United States v. Muzii, 676 F.2d 919, 920 (2d Cir. 1982).
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action will create greater risk to society. The gist of the conspiracy
charge is the agreement to act;77 hence, we recognize the purported dan-
ger of an increased likelihood of success of the criminal endeavor. We
are willing to make this sacrifice because, as discussed earlier, injury is
seriously threatened.
Solicitation is the next step to the left on the spectrum. The incho-
ate crime of solicitation has occasionally been defined as an attempted
conspiracy.78 By criminalizing conduct at this position on the spectrum,
we have moved one large step to the left - away from the actus reus
requirement and toward the mere thoughts category. Historically, the
punishment of solicitation as a crime has been the subject of heated aca-
demic debates. A strong argument must be made that by criminalizing
solicitation, the leftward shift on our spectrum moves so close to punish-
ing guilty thoughts that it is contrary to our principles of justice.
According to Glanville Williams, however, this leftward shift is neces-
sary in order to allow police to prevent crimes - a legitimate goal of
society.79 The obvious antithesis to this view is that as the conduct we
are trying to punish moves closer to the left edge of the spectrum, we
must ask whether the defendant's acts are sufficiently dangerous to war-
rant judicial intervention. While society accepts the hypothesis that a
real danger to our children exists, we position the threshold of punish-
ment much farther to the left and allow police intervention at a much
earlier point. Instead of awaiting the inevitable conclusion of the crimi-
nal conspiracy, we allow the termination of the enterprise upon its
inception.
With this statute, however, the threshold of criminality has been
moved back even farther. Analysis shows that punishment is legisla-
tively created when the actor merely attempts to solicit the child. Refer-
ring back to our model of criminal conduct, the threshold created in
solicitation cases is dangerously close to the left edge - guilty thoughts.
Here, the legislature has encroached even more upon thoughts.
Under Florida law, the crime of attempted solicitation does not
exist;80 however, there is nothing to preclude the creation of such an
offense by the legislature. Here, that is what the legislature has done.
Through the creation of the attempt to solicit, it has created a statutory
double-inchoate crime.
This codified form of double-inchoate crimes is, in logical terms,
77. See id. at § 29.04[A].
78. See id. at § 28.01 [D].
79. See id. (quoting GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 609 (2d ed.
1961)).
80. See Brown v. State, 550 So.2d 142, 144 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1989).
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an attempt at an attempt to conspire.81 All the concerns which have
been raised by the prospect of punishment for attempted conspiracy
immediately become magnified because the acts of the defendant have
not changed, but encroachment of liberty has.
The rationale for punishment of inchoate crimes still applies, but
the farther society moves criminality toward the "thought" end of the
spectrum, the greater the danger to society. Under the unity of purpose,
or strength in numbers analysis commonly done in conspiracy situations,
it is asserted that the mere revelation to another of the criminal scheme
extends the conduct far beyond the realm of preparation and into that of
attempt.8 2 Following that line of reasoning in attempts to attempt to
conspire, there should be an increased danger of completion of the sub-
stantive crime before allowing such drastic motion to the left on our
spectrum.
In reality, this double-inchoate crime problem is rarely expected to
arise. Instead the greater concern is the inchoate crime of solicitation
itself. As discussed earlier, the logic behind the recognition of these
crimes is sound; however, when these reasons are superimposed against
the unusual circumstances presented by on-line activities, heavy-handed
enforcement may create greater concerns. Because there is a tremen-
dous propensity for fantasy on the Internet, overzealous enforcement of
the solicitation statute can easily overstep principles militating against
the punishment of guilty thoughts.
The second element, the attendant circumstance that the actor
believes the person solicited is a child, also presents a concern in the on-
line context. As a law enforcement officer engaged in this ongoing
computer battle, I welcomed the addition of language that enables
undercover operatives to assume identities on-line, posing as children
and covertly conduct investigations. The difficulty encountered is estab-
lishing that the target has a founded belief that the person with whom
they speak, the undercover officer, is in fact a child. This issue is, there-
fore, one of proof, not of ineffective legal drafting. As long as the
officer can demonstrate through evidence and testimony that the
offender "believed" the officer was a child, there is marginal room for
attack. Under conventional forms of covert investigations, this element
is relatively straightforward. If an undercover officer approaches a tar-
get with property claimed by the undercover officer to be stolen and the
target, in turn, purchases the "stolen" goods, it is relatively simple to
prove belief. The officer must simply testify that he told the target the
goods were stolen. In the context of on-line communications, specifi-
81. See generally Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1989).
82. See id. at 31.
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cally the purview of chat rooms and role-playing, it may be much more
difficult to argue successfully that the offender had an actual belief. It is
easy to foresee the defendant claiming that he felt he was merely "role-
playing" and that he believed that the person with whom he was con-
versing was doing the same. The nature of the on-line environment adds
to the difficulty of proof in these cases.
B. The "Guilty Thoughts" Problem to the nth Power
To further complicate matters, virtual communities exist within the
computer world. These communities, called MUDs, MOOs, MUSHs
and a variety of other odd sounding names,83 exist totally within cyber-
space,84 populated only by Internet users.85 Originally the product of
role-playing enthusiasts, they have evolved into much more complex
and interactive spaces well suited for role play and fantasy.86
Professor Sherry Turkle, of MIT, has conducted research in this
area, 87 and she has confirmed what most Internet users have known all
along: there is very little "reality" in virtual reality. The communities
she studied consist of cross-gendered beings that are fictional characters
often bearing no relation to the real identity of the participant.88 These
participants routinely engaged in explicit sexual relations, including vir-
tual rapes and multi-partner sexual trysts. Additionally, accounts of
murders are depicted on-line and thefts of other characters' "virtual"
personal belongings.8 9 These behaviors do not encompass any type of
criminal liability, but do raise interesting questions about fantasy and
role play related to our pedophile discussion.
This world of virtual reality is populated with a limitless array of
characters, all posing as someone other than whom they really are.
From a prosecutorial standpoint, how does one establish that the offend-
ing pedophile had a real belief in the age of his on-line partner. In a
world so overwhelmingly fictional, such as the Internet, it is reasonable
to assume that every on-line user has a very good idea that anyone he
speaks with, in the context of chat-rooms and MUDS, is using mostly
fictional information. In fact, in areas such as IRC, specific rooms dedi-
cate themselves to explicit sexual role play. Virtually any type of sexual
83. See SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 11
(1995).
84. See generally WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984) (coining the term cyberspace
which has gained widespread acceptance as a term referring generally to the virtual world).







fantasy may be witnessed (or participated in), including explicit rapes
and violent encounters. In this environment, where all members of the
room are using assumed identities, there is no ability to determine the
race, sex, or age of the occupants.
This premise may be extended to situations where pedophiles
engage in fantasy role play in their own private channel. Given the
aforementioned information, is it impossible to imagine that the partici-
pants in a pedophile-oriented chat room truly believe, as the statute
requires, that the persons with whom they discuss sexual acts are
children?
Again, the problem lies not in the fact that belief cannot be proven,
but that the unique characteristics of cyberspace create uncommon
impediments to establishing the mental elements of inchoate crimes.
When a computer user on-line knows that every person with whom he is
chatting is assuming some alter ego, there is no plausible way to deter-
mine at what point he becomes convinced that his partner is really the
person he says he is.
While chatting, I may become the President of the United States of
America. Everyone I chat with knows that everyone else is assuming an
identity unrelated to, or at least suppressed by, the real world. When is
it possible to say that someone really believes that they are talking with
the President? In other words, we all know that on-line we are not who
we say we are. Knowing that, we cannot truly expect to be able to say,
beyond a reasonable doubt that discussions of meeting for sex are not
mere "big talk" and braggadocio.
One potential solution, instituted on a procedural level, is through
the adjunct use of traditional undercover operations. By corroborating
the target's belief through controlled telephone calls and awaiting his
actual arrival at a predetermined meeting place, it may be possible to
establish the reality of the target's belief. While this solution seems to
work, it is one that must be instituted on a procedural level, and is not
necessarily called for by the language of the statute.
For example, a target, call him John, engages in an on-line conver-
sation with Jill, an undercover officer posing as a thirteen-year-old child.
After several weeks chatting, e-mails, and picture exchanges, John sug-
gests that he and Jill should meet. John also suggests that when they
meet, Jill should perform fellatio on him.
Clearly, under the definition of section 800.04, Florida Statutes, the
performance of fellatio by a thirteen-year-old girl is a felony of the sec-
ond degree.' Under section 847.0135(3), solicitation to commit any
90. See FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1997).
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illegal act described in chapter 800 relating to lewdness is a felony of the
third degree.9" Therefore, because John has solicited Jill to commit this
lewd act, he can be charged under section 847.0135(3). Conviction is
another matter. Of course, the prosecution must meet the constitutional
level of proof necessary for conviction. Depending upon the ability of
the undercover officer to testify, and the explicitness with which the
offender discussed the details of the meeting, conviction may or may not
be attainable.
The third element of the crime specifically delineates those offenses
where solicitation will incur liability. In essence, these enumerated
crimes are those crimes society views as the real danger. Based upon
the enumerated crimes, it is clear that the legislature desires to protect
children from sexual contact. It may therefore be inferred that the pur-
pose of this statute is to prevent children from being victimized sexually
through the use of computers - a noble goal. The enumerated crimes
are irrefutably harmful to society - particularly to children. They are
generally well established as legitimately proscribed conduct, and they
are quite beyond question in regard to enforceability.
The amendment of section 847.0135 is clearly the result of
increased public awareness of the use by sexual predators of the com-
puter for victim selection and contact. Is this a rational response to a
genuine threat, or is this a knee-jerk reaction to a perceived danger?
Further critical analysis of the methodology currently used by law
enforcement agencies is required. This analysis must be superimposed
against the questions about the statue itself, and the intricacies of the
computer world already discussed.
C. Entrapment
1. OVERVIEW OF ENTRAPMENT AS THE DEFENSE
One of the most difficult situations encountered by any undercover
officer during covert operations is the problem of entrapment. This
problem is no trivial matter. Normally, the added difficulties of cyber-
space only intensify the problem. Cyberspace produces greater issues
regarding proof of predisposition when targeting defendants. A proper
analysis must start with a careful examination of the defense itself, then
progress into the application of that defense to the current problem.
Entrapment is an affirmative defense that exonerates a defendant
from conviction for otherwise criminal conduct because of law enforce-
ment tactics. Although the defense was characterized during early years
91. See FLA. STAT. § 847.0135(3) (1997).
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as a defense of limited use,92 one may speculate that the heightened war
on drugs and the explosion of drug related crime during the 1980s
stretched police enforcement efforts to the very limits of legal accepta-
bility. In conjunction with the explosion of drug trafficking in the
1980s, law enforcement faced a unique problem. Methods of enforce-
ment lacked effectiveness. The traditional, reactive style of policing, so
well suited to burglary, grand theft, or murder investigation, became
nearly useless in the context of narcotics smuggling and sales. The
shackling of law enforcement effectiveness necessarily led to innovative
methods through which to attack the problem.
These innovations, while obviously not entirely new, were
employed on a grand scale. Tactics such as undercover operations and
street level interdiction operations became not the exception, but stan-
dard operating practice. That is not to say that the technique of under-
cover operation was never before used. The nuance here, however, was
the methods and scale with which agencies employed the tactic. A
method reserved heretofore for specific, targeted operations, such as sto-
len property rings, prostitution organizations, and gambling was now
employed in the mass market of criminal conduct.
The process, which I euphemistically refer to as "Darwinism in the
hood," transposes Darwin's evolutionary theory into the highly acceler-
ated world of competitive criminal life. While human characteristics
and genetic codes do not necessarily adapt more rapidly, their abilities to
transform themselves and their environment does. This is seen no more
readily than in the adaptability of criminals to new methods of
enforcement.
As criminals metamorphose into beings of superior criminal intel-
lect, their methods of criminal accomplishment distill into better and
more powerful tools, and law enforcement does what it has done for
years - it plays catch up. True to its nature, the slow moving, slothful
creature that is government, evolves in this ever more competitive bioce-
nosis at a somewhat slower pace. It does, however, evolve. Contrary to
popular thought, the police must adapt or they will be overcome. In the
1980s, the problem was drugs, most particularly, street-level drugs.
Today, it is the Internet criminal. Tomorrow - who knows?
In the 1980s and early 1990s, law enforcement redirected its
response to the drug war in novel ways. One of the most novel was the
manufacture of crack cocaine by the Broward County, Florida Sheriffs
Office for resale to potential defendants.93 This adaptive response is an
inevitable reaction to changing patterns in criminal conduct. Not sur-
92. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
93. See State v. Williams, 623 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1993).
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prisingly, when law enforcement assumes a more aggressive enforce-
ment prerogative, issues arise surrounding the exact extent to which
police may encourage criminals to commit crimes.
Based on historical lessons learned through the fight against drugs
law enforcement has become slightly more agile. When the eventual,
some say predictable, happened, and criminals began to capitalize on the
resources of computer technology, most police agencies clamored to
recruit and train computer literate officers. With this we again see the
aggressive, proactive use of undercover techniques, this time applied to
virtual reality.
Law enforcement embraces cyberspace as a new venue from which
to conduct covert operations for the same reasons that criminals are
drawn to the Internet. Gone are the days of the U/C line.94 Today's' U/
C line is a hotmail, E-mail account and an Internet connection. 95 The
benefits are obvious. Little cost is involved, especially compared with
the relatively large expenditure necessary to establish a conventional
cover, and many targets may be worked simultaneously in a short period
of time. Officers are no longer limited by the awkward burdens of time
and space. Most importantly, an undercover officer can assume any
identity, age, or gender required by the intelligence data.
Over time, this new area of attack will necessarily attract its share
of entrapment defense claims. Even under the best conditions, the
undercover officers, involves herself in the encouragement of the
offender to commit the crime. Eventually a defendant will present him-
self in a manner more conducive to the ability to raise the entrapment
defense if the "child" with whom he is discussing oral sex is a law
enforcement official.
2. FEDERAL ENTRAPMENT - THE EXEGESIS OF THE DEFENSE
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court recognized the affirma-
tive defense of entrapment for the first time in the seminal case of Sor-
rells v. United States.96 From this humble beginning, the defense has
undergone a divergent path of interpretation fraught with strong debate
between scholars and judges. Along one path there lies the "subjective"
definition of entrapment which is first announced in Sorrells. The other
is the "objective" test, best established by Justice Roberts' concurrence
94. Law enforcement parlance for a dedicated telephone line, usually listed in a fictional non-
existent name, from which telephone calls could be placed or received during undercover sting
operations.
95. Hotmail, a product of Microsoft@, offers free E-mail accounts without verification of
identity. Criminals and cops alike can assume as many personae through E-mail addresses as they
wish.
96. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
[Vol. 54:405
CYBERPREDATORS
in the same case. While these two paths have similar characteristics,
they are predicated upon slightly different lines of legal reasoning.
i. The Subjective Standard
The subjective test established by Sorrells views the question from
the defendant's standpoint.97 If the defendant had no criminal predispo-
sition, and was induced by governmentally-sponsored deception, then he
cannot be held liable for the crime.98 Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Hughes relied heavily on the principle that criminal conduct and
punishment for actions must stem from culpability. This criminal intent
must originate with the defendant, not the government.99 Where the
criminal intent is based upon the governments' provocation, there is
really no criminal intent on the part of the defendant and he should not
be punished.""°
ii. The Objective Standard
As stated earlier, Justice Roberts' concurrence opinion in Sorrells
established the objective test for entrapment.' ° ' In this matter, Justice
Roberts relied heavily on the government agents' entreating conduct.102
Much later, in Sherman v. United States,'03 Justice Frankfurter said that
the objective approach "shifts attention ... to the conduct of the police
and the likelihood, objectively considered, that it would entrap only
those ready and willing to commit crime."'" In essence, the questions
asked under the objective test look more critically at the nature of the
police conduct employed to ensnare the target. While the distinctions
between the two analyses may be slight, the intrinsic versus extrinsic
perspectives make a world of difference.
The subjective theory requires the finder of fact to determine the
question of entrapment. Conversely, Justices Roberts' and Frankfurter's
objective approach asks whether the police conduct is a proper use of
governmental power. 105 Justices Roberts and Frankfurter focus the anal-
ysis on the conduct of police, theorizing that the defense of entrapment
is oriented toward curtailing abusive police practices.
97. See generally Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
98. See Elena Luisa Garella, Reshaping The Federal Entrapment Defense: Jacobson v. United
States, 68 Wash. L. Rev. 185 (1993).
99. See id. at 188.
100. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
101. See id. at 459.
102. See id.
103. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
104. Id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
105. See id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court have entrenched the
subjective approach. In United States v. Russell, t06 the court addressed a
second issue tied to the entrapment defense. The defendant in Russell
alleged that the police conduct was so egregious as to violate the Due
Process Clause.10 7 The court reasoned that, in theory, the possibility
exists that distasteful police conduct can rise to the level of a due pro-
cess issue, but it did not do so in this case.10 8 Rather, the court focused
on the predisposition of the defendant.
Taking this line of reasoning one step further, in United States v.
Hampton,"°9 the Court conflated the tests for entrapment and due pro-
cess, and it ruled that proof of a defendant's predisposition precludes use
of either as a defense. 110 In so holding, Justice Rehnquist relied heavily
upon the decisions in both Russell and Sherman, reiterating that entrap-
ment arises only when "the Government's deception actually implants
the criminal design in the mind of the defendant ..... "1' Because the
Court found the defendant predisposed to commit the crime he was
unable to raise the defense. Although the United States Supreme Court
categorically rejected the "objective" standard of due process, the
Supreme Court of Florida has, on occasion, considered its adoption.
3. THE FLORIDA STANDARD
i. The Cruz Test
In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court accepted the objective test for
entrapment in Cruz v. State.112 In Cruz, a police officer posed as a
drunken indigent displaying $150 dangling from his rear pocket. The
defendant, took the money and was arrested. Justice Erhlich, writing for
the majority, outlined the evolution of the entrapment defense, through
Sorrells, Sherman and eventually Hampton. Justice Erhlich departs
from United States Supreme Court precedent and posits that a subjective
test and an objective test can coexist in Florida's jurisprudence. 1 3 To
bolster this postulate, Justice Erhlich cites a New Jersey Supreme Court
decision that, in his opinion, supports the proposition.114
106. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
107. See id. at 430.
108. See id.
109. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
110. See id. at 488.
111. Id. at 489. (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 436).
112. 465 So.2d 516, cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 (1985) (superseded by FLA. STAT. § 777.201);
cf Gonzalez v. State, 571 So.2d 1346 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1990).
113. See Cruz, 465 So.2d at 521.
114. See id. (citing State v. Molnar, 410 A.2d 37, 41 (N.J. 1980), rev'd, State v. Purnell, 199
N.J. LExis 832 (N.J. July 7, 1999)).
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The Molnar court viewed the defense of entrapment from the stand-
point that police conduct, not the predisposition of the defendant, is the
key. It accepted the subjective test of Sorrells. Further, the Molnar
court stated that even when the defendant is shown to be predisposed,
certain law enforcement practices may nevertheless preclude conviction
of the defendant. In the court's opinion, the egregiousness of the con-
duct controlled more than the mere predisposition of the defendant." 5
The net result of the Cruz decision is to create a two-prong test to
gauge entrapment. The Cruz test, establishes an objective threshold of
entrapment. Once the objective threshold is passed, the second prong
becomes "whether the criminal design originates with the officials of the
government.... 116 In essence, the second prong is a test for predispo-
sition in slightly different terms.
The Cruz court established a specific guide for trial courts, and it
announced exactly what must be the subject of inquiry in such a case. 7
To pass the Cruz test, police conduct must "(1) have as its end the inter-
ruption of a specific ongoing criminal activity; and (2) utilize means
reasonably tailored to apprehend those involved in the ongoing criminal
activity."' 8 Applying this test to the facts of Cruz, the court reasoned
that the state's conduct was entrapment as a matter of law.
ii. The Legislative Answer to Cruz and the Court's Response: In
Through the backdoor
This Cruz test for entrapment was short-lived. In 1987, perhaps in
response to the Florida Supreme Court's flirtation with the objective test
issue, the Florida Legislature adopted section 777.201.119 This legisla-
tion clearly established that entrapment in Florida was to be decided by a
subjective standard. Not until Gonzalez v. State, 120 however, was it was
clear that the statutory entrapment test replaced the Cruz test. While
Gonzalez was the first case to reconcile the two standards, it was not the
most influential. For that one must examine Munoz v. State.' 21
In Munoz, Justice Overton, writing for the majority, clarified rather
succinctly that the legislature eliminated the objective test of Cruz.1
22
The court, however, retained the ability to examine the entrapment issue
115. See id.
116. Cruz, 465 So.2d at 521 (quoting to Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
117. Cruz, 465 So.2d at 521-22.
118. Id. at 522.
119. See FLA STAT. § 777.201 (1987).
120. 571 So.2d 1346 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1990).
121. 629 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1993).
122. See id. at 91.
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under a state constitutional Due Process analysis. Specifically, the
Munoz court recognized the legislature's ability to abolish judicially
established principles of decision making. It cannot, however, remove
freedoms guaranteed under the Florida Constitution.1 23 Through this
rationale, the court established that entrapment in Florida may still be
determined in a pseudo-objective manner under the guise of due process
analysis. 124 By implicating the Florida Constitution and predicating the
due process analysis upon it, the Court adeptly removed the issue from
the purview of the United States Supreme Court. The Munoz decision
established a Cruz-type standard under a refurbished countenance.
The new test under Florida law, post-Munoz, is again a two-part
test. If the conduct of law enforcement is so egregious that it shocks the
conscience of the court, then entrapment, as a matter of law, may be
based upon the principle of due process. Absent egregious conduct, the
test rests solely upon the subjective standard established by the Supreme
Court in Jacobson v. United States.125 Under the logic of Munoz, the
legislature withdrew the objective standard test from the state supreme
court. The Florida Supreme Court, however, reincarnated it under the
guise of state constitutional analysis, making some form of the "objec-
tive test" for entrapment a continued viable affirmative defense. In fact,
Justice Kogan, in concurrence, spoke of this implication: "Thus, the
majority appears to toss 'objective entrapment' out the front door but
then readmits essentially the same concept into Florida law via the rear
entrance, with some minor tinkering as to analysis."
' 126
Under Munoz, the defense of subjective entrapment is evaluated in
three stages. First, the defendant must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the government agent induced his criminal conduct.
127
The second issue examines the defendant's predisposition to commit the
charged offense.' 28 On this issue, the burden again lies with the defend-
ant. As indicated in Munoz, however, the defendant's burden is mini-
mal. 129 Once this threshold has been met the burden of proof shifts to
the prosecution. To rebut the defendant's evidence of lack of predispo-
sition, the prosecution must establish its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. 130 The third and final question raised is who is the proper deci-
123. See id. at 98-99.
124. See id. at 99.
125. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
126. Munoz, 629 So.2d at 102 (Kogan, J., concurring).
127. See id. at 99; see also FLA. STAT. § 777.201 (1997).
128. See Munoz, 629 So.2d at 99.
129. See id. (stating that "as soon as the defendant produces evidence of no predisposition, the




sion maker for the issue of subjective entrapment.
Under the statute, it is clear that the decision shall be made by the
trier of fact. 31 The court however, takes the analysis further. If the
defendant presents evidence of lack of predisposition where the factual
circumstances are not in dispute and the government cannot reach the
level of proof required to prove predisposition, then the trial judge may
rule on the issue as a matter of law. 132 In the remaining cases, the issue
of subjective entrapment must go to the jury.
D. Application of the Principle to the Problem
We can superimpose Florida's affirmative defense of entrapment
against police conduct allegedly rife with potential for abuse. The
court's dictum in Munoz points heavily toward a preference for, and
reluctance to depart from, a two-step analysis of the entrapment defense.
It is, therefore, essential that we examine the due process issue first.
1 33
1. DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
To provide a map of conduct constituting a due process violation
under the Munoz standard, it is beneficial to examine conduct previously
considered as such. In State v. Glosson, 134 the state provided a substan-
tial monetary incentive for an informant to arrange a drug deal, secure
an arrest, testify, and obtain a conviction. Upon the completion of these
conditions, the informant would receive ten percent of all forfeiture pro-
ceedings. Based upon these facts, the Supreme Court of Florida found
that entrapment had occurred as a matter of law.' 35 Although this case
predates Munoz, the opinion is quite beneficial to our discussion because
it rests upon due process violations, not upon the Cruz test.
In Glosson, the court rejects the notion that Hampton v. United
States13 6 forecloses the use of a due process defense by a defendant who
is predisposed under the entrapment analysis.1 37 By rejecting the very
limited use of due process in the federal courts, the state supreme court
effectively shifted the focus from the defendants' predisposition to the
government's conduct. This fact, as stated earlier, creates a hole in post-
131. See FLA. STAT. § 777.2012; see also Munoz, 629 So.2d at 100.
132. See Munoz, 629 So.2d at 100.
133. See id. at 99. The wording of the opinion, "in the absence of egregious law enforcement
conduct," makes it syntactically clear that this must be determined first. One cannot determine the
presence or absence of a condition without first addressing the elements surrounding and
comprising that condition.
134. 462 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1985).
135. See id. at 1085.
136. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
137. See Glosson, 462 So.2d at 1084.
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Munoz entrapment jurisprudence. Glosson, however, fails to establish
much more than a broad proposition, offering little guidance as to what
constitutes a violation of due process.
In State v. Williams,1 38 the Glosson analysis again became pivotal.
The Williams court overturned a criminal conviction citing due process
violations and using the same reasoning as in Glosson. The Williams
Court admitted that "[d]efining the limits of due process is difficult
because 'due process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical concep-
tion with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."'
39
The Court, expounding upon this, stated that "due process is a general
principle of law that prohibits the government from obtaining convic-
tions brought about by methods that offend a sense of justice."'14
Applying these precepts, the Williams court specifically addressed the
use of undercover "reverse-sting operations" and found them to be
unequivocally permissible.' The court accepted the proposition that the
police may provide the defendant with controlled substances as part of
the undercover operation.
4 2
Under the particular facts of Williams, however, the court found
that the reverse-sting operation in question violated due process. The
cogent condition seems to be the manufacture of the crack cocaine by
the Broward Sheriffs Office. 1 4 3 Absent this factor, it is likely the court
would have held the police undercover-reverse-sting operation permissi-
ble. The salient premise that emerges is that police engaged in a crimi-
nal act cannot profit from their misconduct.'"
The Court's heavy reliance on the "canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice[,]' 14 5 combined with the analysis in
Glosson, "I might provide guidance in future cases raised under due pro-
cess theory in the context of online investigations.
As in most jurisprudential analysis into uncharted territory, one
138. 623 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1993).
139. Id. at 465. (quoting Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162
(1951))(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Williams, 623 So.2d at 465 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
141. See Williams, 623 So.2d at 465.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 466.
144. See id. at 464. The Court spent considerable time and effort in addressing the dangerous
nature of crack cocaine, and that the Broward Sheriffs Office admittedly failed to recover all the
crack in the reverse stings.
145. Id. at 465.
146. See Glosson, 462 So.2d at 1085. (The underlying principle seems to be the tremendous
incentive to the informant to commit perjury and distort the true nature of the justice system. The
nature of his conduct created an unacceptable risk that criminal activity would be created in the
innocent, not intercepted in the predisposed. The court was unwilling to accept this.).
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must apply existing canons of law to new, untested factual situations.
Internet investigative police activity is most closely analogous to under-
cover police sting operations. The modality of these operations is indis-
tinguishable from a narcotics sales operation or a prostitution sweep.
Particularly, the street level approaches to both crimes, narcotics sales
and prostitution, lends itself well to the analysis. From an objectivity
point of view, therefore, the use of the virtual "street-corner" becomes
simply another police sting operation. As clearly pointed out in Wil-
liams, police undercover operations do not shock the sense of justice.
147
In cases arising from informant-based tips, the analysis follows the same
reasoning as Glosson as it pertains to the due process issue. Provided
the informant's conduct is not so ripe for the possibility of the creation
of criminal conduct where none formerly existed, there seems to be a
nominal opportunity for success in this posture.
One could, however, imagine a situation in which a defendant,
involved in an organized ring of pedophiles and child pornography col-
lectors becomes ensnared by police operations. Subsequently, he agrees
to cooperate by providing introductions to co-conspirators, and arranges
for an exchange of child pornography. In that scenario, the Glosson
caveat must apply in a form no different from that addressed by narcot-
ics investigators for years.
In the final analysis of the due process prong, it is foreseeable that a
situation analogous to Williams may arise. During many investigations
of child pornography and Internet solicitation the defendant asks for
photos of the child with whom he believes he is conversing. The situa-
tion then presents itself much like the Williams polemic. While it is not
disputed that the transmission of child pornography is illegal, there is a
clear comparison between that activity and the provision, by law
enforcement, of narcotics during undercover reverse-sting operations.
The courts are clear. "[F]urnishing of a controlled substance by govern-
ment agents in a reverse-sting operation [does] not constitute outrageous
conduct.... 148
Unlike the child pornography statute, Florida Statutes section
893.13 (5)(c) excludes from prosecution law enforcement officials who
deliver a controlled substance during the course of a bona fide law
enforcement activity.149 The lack of a law enforcement exclusion in the
child pornography statutes arguably makes the practice illegal. 5 ' While
this issue has yet to come before the Supreme Court of Florida, it seems
147. See Williams, 623 So.2d at 465.
148. Id.
149. See FLA. STAT. § 893.13(5)(c) (1997); see also Williams, 623 So.2d at 466.
150. See generally FLA. STAT. § 847.0135; see also Fla. Stat. § 847; FLASTAT. § 827.
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clear that the Williams reasoning may prevail. The inherent dangers of
this conduct outweigh the ends to be reached.'51 If a police undercover
officer engaged in an on-line criminal investigation furnishes a defend-
ant with some form of child pornography, he has crossed the boundary
of egregious conduct established by Williams. 152 Like Williams, he vio-
lated the due process clause of Florida's Constitution. Under current
law, it is unclear whether criminal prosecution would be pursued in this
case. If it were, it is fairly well established that under the foregoing
analysis the court would find entrapment as a matter of law.
2. THE SUBJECTIVE APPROACH
From our analysis, it is not difficult to determine that the challenge
to police "Internet solicitation" cases will rarely come under the due
process theory of entrapment. Instead, the Munoz standard of subjective
entrapment will likely be the approach taken by criminal defense attor-
neys seeking to attack the police operation. This subjective analysis
becomes more difficult with the interjection of the inherent nuances of
cyberspace conduct.
As indicated earlier, the Munoz court established a three-step test
for subjective entrapment. 153 Each step must be considered indepen-
dently. The first issue is inducement. 154 The typical scenario involves
on-line contact between the undercover officer and the accused. The
accused often initiates the contact based upon the suggestiveness of the
officer's screen name or another alluring factor. In Munoz, a law
enforcement agent initiated the contact.1 5 Clearly, Munoz bolsters the
hypothesis that inducement is present where law enforcement initiates
the contact. Likewise, in Jacobson, the government contacted the
accused regarding his interest in pornography. 156 A number of Florida
appellate cases support this proposition.
1 57
Disparity exists among the Florida District Courts of Appeal as to
what constitutes inducement where the initial contact is not explicitly
made by law enforcement. On one hand, the Third District failed to find
151. See generally 623 So.2d 462.
152. See Williams 623 So.2d at 467.
153. See Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90, 99-100.
154. See id. at 99 ("The first question to be addressed under the subjective test is whether an
agent of the government induced the accused to commit the offense charged").
155. See id. at 101 (juvenile entered the video store and attempted to rent an X-rated video
tape).
156. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 n. 2 (1992).
157. See Nadeau v. State, 683 So.2d 504 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1995) (informant contacted accused
over 12 times to convince him to get involved); State v. Ramos, 632 So.2d 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct.




inducement where police set up a decoy sting operation. 158 On the other
hand, the Second District found that police induced the accused by
advertising the availability of pornography in the newspaper.159 The
similarity of these cases is clear.
In Dawson, the police were aware of a problem with luggage thefts
from the airport and established a decoy operation that provided circum-
stances conducive to lure a thief into action.160 In Beattie, the police
established a decoy operation designed to lure a child pornographer into
action.1 61 The only difference - the type of bait. In both scenarios the
police clearly fished for defendants of a particular nature. Dawson was
a thief, Beattie, a pedophile. Same game, different lures. The inapposite
results cause consternation.
A powerful argument can be made that an undercover police
officer's mere presence in a chat room of sexually explicit orientation
constitutes no more than the mere opportunity to commit a crime.
Notwithstanding, the analogy to Beattie, the mere presence of an under-
cover operative in a chat room feels unlike creative activity and more
like mere opportunity.
Occasionally, police create their own chat room. Generally, this
room bears a suggestive title and topic designed to attract persons
predisposed to criminal activity of the nature advertised by the topic. In
this situation, the analogy to Beattie becomes much more powerful. The
distinction between mere opportunity and inducement becomes much
more blurred. 
162
In reality, this question poses few problems for law enforcement.
The major question addressed in most entrapment arguments is that of
predisposition. 163 This defense may rise in significance with the
increase in difficulty of proving predisposition in cyberspace. Given
law enforcement's use of this investigative technique, the argument may
be shifted, by the state, from that of having to prove predisposition, to
proving that police investigative techniques did induce the defendant's
conduct. If the state's conduct merely presents the opportunity, the
defense of entrapment may be precluded without further need to show
predisposition. 64
158. See State v. Dawson, 681 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1996) (holding that police placing a
piece of luggage near pay phone, defendant picking it up and walking away is not inducement).
159. See Beattie v. State, 636 So.2d 744 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1993) (finding that police placement
of newspaper advertisement constitutes inducement).
160. See Dawson, 681 So.2d at 1207.
161. See Beattie, 636 So.2d at 745.
162. See generally id.
163. See 2 RUSSELL E. CRAwFoRD, FLORIDA CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 11.20
(1994).
164. See Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90, 99 (Fla. 1993).
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If, however, the police conduct does connote inducement, then the
second issue, and arguably the most controversial, is evaluated.165 Pre-
disposition has been the object of controversy for years, even before the
introduction of the new variable of cyberspace. In federal jurisprudence,
the controlling case is Jacobson v. United States.166 Jacobson has
become a key factor in Florida's analysis through reference in the con-
trolling decision of Munoz. Munoz established predisposition as the sec-
ond stage of the three stage analysis in entrapment defenses.167 This
stage places a large burden upon the prosecution to show that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.' 68 After a minimal ini-
tial showing of the lack of predisposition by the defendant, the state
must rebut this negative beyond a reasonable doubt.' 69 This rebuttal
stage poses the most threat to the state's case.
Several authors addressing this question have called for stricter reg-
ulation of police conduct. For example, one author perceives the nature
of police on-line conduct as "repeated inducement of online undercover
agents." 170 While the author's characterization of police conduct is
clearly entrapment under Jacobson,7 1 it is the exception to the rule
when dealing with most police investigation of this nature. Most investi-
gations proceed along a path of prioritization. From initial contact
through arrest, the investigating officer must constantly assess the
probability of a successful meeting with the target. The expenditure of
valuable resources to cajole a single target into committing an act of
solicitation is poor management.
The more appropriate examination, under the predisposition test of
Jacobson, is what police conduct constitutes an appropriate use of
resources. In Jacobson, law enforcement directly targeted its conduct at
Keith Jacobson.1 72 The police directly and repeatedly solicited him into
the commission of the crime. Clearly, Jacobson had been targeted from
the initial outset of the investigation based upon the appearance of his
name on a mailing list. 173 The Court relied on the premise that the gov-
ernment cannot "originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent per-
son's mind the disposition to commit a criminal act and then induce
165. See id.
166. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
167. See Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 99.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. Jennifer Gregg, Caught in the Web: Entrapment in Cyberspace, 19 HASTiNGS COMM. &
ENr. L.J. 157, 188 (1996).
171. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 541 (repeated requests that defendant purchase child





commission of the crime so that the Government may prosecute. 174
Justice White, writing for the majority, specifically condoned the
provision, by police, of the opportunity to commit a criminal act.1 75 Piv-
otal in this argument is Justice White's statement that "the entrapment
defense is of little use because the ready commission of the criminal act
amply demonstrates the defendant's predisposition."' 76 The Florida
Supreme Court copied and imbedded the premise and text of this argu-
ment in the Munoz decision.' 77 It is quite clear that the predominant
factor in establishing the entrapment defense under both lines of cases is
the untoward solicitations by the government agents.
E. Application of Entrapment to Cyberspace
From here, we start our dissection of the Internet cases. By way of
analogy, we must locate police investigative practices that closely
resemble those which we wish to examine. As discussed earlier, the
nature of the crime and the method used to detect it are similar to both
narcotics and prostitution stings. Within these broad categories of police
investigation exist more specific subcategories. Both types of crime are
often the target of a police tactic known as a "reverse sting."'' 78 Police
direct these operations at the interdiction of street-level criminal activity.
They are distinguished from other forms of narcotics and prostitution
operations in that they have no specific target as the ultimate goal. The
goal is, in effect, to reduce the ongoing criminal conduct occurring in
specific areas. A police agency routinely institutes a sting operation
upon receipt of complaints of specific criminal activity in a given
locality.
Under this modality, the police establish decoy officers posing as
either drug dealers or prostitutes awaiting customer traffic in the sweep
area. These methods of operation, often criticized for putting legally
seized narcotics back onto the street, 17 9 frequently come under judicial
scrutiny particularly on entrapment grounds.
Although this issue remains untested at the United States Supreme
Court level, it has arisen at the appellate level of several states. Most
closely analogous is State v. James.'80 In James, the police set up a
reverse-sting in a neighborhood known for criminal narcotics activity,
174. Id. at 548 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)).
175. Id. at 549-50.
176. Id. at. 550.
177. See Munoz, 629 So.2d at 99-100.
178. See People v. Wesley, 274 Cal. Rptr. 326, 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
179. Larry Hartstein, Legality of Using Seized Drugs in Stings Questioned, AArrA J., Jul.
17, 1998.
180. 484 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
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and sold cocaine through an undercover officer to defendant James. 18
On appeal, the court addressed two issues: violation of due process by
reverse-sting operations, and the predisposition of James. 182 Like the
situation in on-line chat rooms, where officers establish suggestive-
sounding names and frequent explicitly named chat rooms, the officer in
James assumed a role conducive to attracting persons predispose to
commit the offense. He posed in an area and in a manner consistent
with a genuine street level dealer. Likewise, in People v. Wesley,' 83 the
undercover officer posed as a street-level drug dealer in an area known
for high volume drug sales.1 84 In both situations unsolicited customers
eventually approached the undercover officers and engaged in a narcot-
ics transaction.
185
In addition to the due process analysis, the James court found that
under Minnesota's "subjective" test for entrapment the state could prove
the defendant's predisposition by his "active solicitation to commit the
crime."'8 6 Pivotal in the court's analysis was the fact that the defendant
approached the undercover officer in an area known for cocaine sales,
negotiated with the officer, and used appropriate jargon of the drug
trade. 87 Similarly, the Wesley, court found the defendant, predisposed
based on his conduct during the initial officer contact, notwithstanding
that the defendant was not the specific target of a criminal
investigation. 
88
From these cases it is clear that predisposition may be established
circumstantially through the defendant's conduct. Reading these cases
in conjunction with Jacobson, it is possible to surmise that a distinction
must be drawn between specific undercover activities directed at spe-
cific targets, and those directed at specific activities. As established in
Jacobson, "where the defendant is simply provided with the opportunity
to commit a crime, the entrapment defense is of little use because the
ready commission of the criminal act amply demonstrates the defend-
ant's predisposition."'' 89 Clearly, if law enforcement has identified a
specific area of criminal activity - in James, a house known for high
volume drug sales - then reverse-sting activities are permissible uses of
181. See id. at 800.
182. See id. at 801-03.
183. 247 Cal. Rptr 326 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
184. See id. at 327 (officer carried a stereo prop and placed the cocaine rocks in a ziplock
baggie).
185. See id. at 1136; see also James 484 N.W.2d at 800.
186. James, 484 N.w.2d at 803 (quoting State v. Grilli, 230 N.W.2d 445, 453 (Minn. 1975)).
187. See James, 484 N.W.2d at 803.
188. See Wesley, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 333. In Wesley the defendant also approached the
undercover and made the initial solicitation.
189. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992).
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police authority. Additionally, the conduct of the defendant immedi-
ately prior to initial contact, the manner of the contact, and the linguis-
tics of the exchange are all factors considered to establish the
predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. On-line solicitation
cases must be examined like street-level reverse-stings because of their
similarity in method of operation. Under this premise, it is clear that
within the strict parameters referred above, activities such as entering a
chat room under a suggestive name and awaiting contact by a potential
molester are no different from the activities of the Minneapolis Police
Department in James.
Unlike street-level narcotic sales, the on-line transaction is not an
immediate one leading to instantaneous arrest. Rather, it is a more
drawn out exchange, a cat and mouse type of seduction. Invariably,
however, the first few moments of the exchange between the target and
the undercover transpire in almost identical fashion. The target estab-
lishes the age of the undercover officer by asking for the age, sex, and
location from which the officer is chatting. Thereafter, the conversation
proceeds within the framework of any normal solicitation exchange,
operating much as a solicitation for prostitution. By incorporating the
decision in Jacobson, it is clear that the transaction or criminal solicita-
tion need not be an immediate consequence of the target's initial
approach. As Justice White stated, this premise could be applied to "a
more elaborate 'sting' operation involving government-sponsored fenc-
ing ...."190 This statement clearly encompasses the context of a drawn
out negotiation between the police and the accused where the accused
makes the initial offer of sexual contact only after some extended small
talk.
As stated earlier, there are critics of the use of undercover tech-
niques to investigate these on-line solicitations. As part of the argument
in support of stronger standards for Internet police conduct, one author
postulates a scenario as follows.
For example, consider the situation where a suspected pedophile is
engaging in "racy" but lawful speech and is approached by an
undercover agent using a suggestive user name and profile. The
agent makes "indecent" (illegal under the CDA) comments which
induce the user to respond in kind, with the exchange culminating in
a request for illegal material.191
While the existence of this of type exchange has undoubtedly been
documented, it is a misperception of the true nature of police conduct
on-line. I agree with the author that the above referenced exchange, if it
190. Id.
191. Gregg, supra note 170, at 188.
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were to have occurred, would probably rise to the level of entrapment as
a matter of law under Jacobson. The agent makes initial contact. It is a
mistake to assume that police agents conduct themselves in a manner
substantially different when on-line than when in person. If an under-
cover officer approaches a specific defendant and repeatedly solicits him
for criminal activity, most police and prosecutors agree that the conduct
is probably within the purview of Jacobson. Most real life cases simply
do not unfold this way. In reality, the on-line cases are quite similar in
inception to most street-level drug cases, with the added twist of
anonymity.
The setting of cyberspace lends an added dimension to police
undercover activities. Perhaps, given the difficulties inherent in this
medium, the judicial system should reconsider the way in which we
examine predisposition. I believe, unlike some, that predisposition still
may be established through Internet contacts.
The nature of the human psyche is such that predisposition is not an
on and off concept.'92 A person's predisposition is most closely illus-
trated not by a light switch, with two positions - on and off - but by a
continuum. On the left edge of the continuum there exists no predispo-
sition to commit deviant sexual behavior. On the far right edge there
exists an overwhelming predisposition to commit the deviant act. It is
Dr. Marshall's theory that the mere presence in an on-line chat room,
clearly orientated toward sexually explicit talk about sex with children,
evidences a shift from the far left edge of the continuum toward the
right. It is postulated that by the mere presence in that situation, those
engaging in the on-line conduct have exhibited some predisposition
toward the commission of those deviant acts. It naturally follows then
that the further the subject involves himself, the greater his predisposi-
tion becomes.
For example, if the subject begins to participate in conversations
with others who are engaged in pedophilic-type fantasy and role play, it
can naturally be assumed that his predisposition to commit this type of
offense has increased. While the offender's disposition may still be
nothing more than fantasy in the abstract, it must be recognized that
persons with no tendency toward deviant behavior would not find them-
selves in this position in the first place.193 The further the subject
becomes enmeshed in this fantasy and experimentation, and the more
overt the advances toward a child on-line become, the further to the right
192. Telephone Interview with William L. Marshall, Ph.D., Director of Bath Institution Sexual





on the continuum of predisposition the offender moves. At the far right
of the continuum is the actual meeting between the offender and his
victim. While it is not asserted that an offender's criminal predisposi-
tion is directly equivalent to psychological predisposition toward deviant
behavior, it is illustrative of the fact that the mere presence in a child-sex
oriented chat room lends credibility to the standard in James, which con-
siders the offender's presence in a known crime area.
In Dr. Marshall's experience, a person does not become pedophilic
based upon child pornography fantasy and role play.194 A psychological
predisposition within the subject generates this behavior. The unique
nature of this crime must be distinguished from narcotics offenses and
other types of crimes. Other types of crimes may be committed by any-
one, given the proper inducement. Unlike other crimes, a deviant attrac-
tion to children precedes the action of soliciting a child on-line. From
that logical assertion, it naturally follows that absent this deviant attrac-
tion a person could not be induced to solicit a child. In other crimes,
such as theft, there need not be a deviant attraction for inducement suffi-
cient to spur action. Sexually related crimes, however, by the nature of
their deviant characteristics, theoretically will only be committed by per-
sons of a deviant predisposition.
It therefore logically follows, that unless the subject is psychologi-
cally predisposed to commit this specific type of sex offense, the leap
from on-line fantasy to in-person meetings is impossible. From a psy-
chological standpoint, a person engaged in experimentation and fantasy
would not generally be expected to carry out the deviant sexual act with-
out the existence of the pedophilic disorder. The concerns expressed
over the danger that innocent experimenters and role players will there-
fore become ensnared by police conduct become greatly reduced under
that theory. 195
As recognized before, there is a difference between psychological
predisposition and criminal predisposition. It is entirely possible, and
even probable, that a person suffering from pedophilia may be fully psy-
chologically predisposed to commit deviant acts on a child. It does not
necessarily follow that he will allow this predisposition to override his
desire to remain within the law. In drawing the above analogy, I am not
advancing the argument that psychological predisposition should satisfy
the criminal predisposition standard. Instead, the argument illustrates
that by this type of examination, the concern over the fantasy and "big
194. See id.
195. But see generally Part I supra (concerning the current structure of § 847.0135 and the
implications of punishing guilty thoughts).
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talk"'96 can be dealt with through a requirement for an overt act in the
"real world."
As clearly outlined above, this analysis results in the recognition
that police conduct on-line, if done in conjunction with proper "real
world" police investigative techniques not unlike any other vice opera-
tion, can establish legal predisposition.
F. The Proposed Solution
Concern remains over the interaction between section 847.0135 (3),
Florida Statute Stat. and those persons who are predisposed to deviant
behavior but not predisposed to deviant criminal behavior. 197 The crea-
tion under the Florida statute of "double-inchoate crimes" moves the
point of criminal conduct well into the area of thoughts antecedent
action. The legislature must repeal section 847.0135(3) Florida Statute
and subsequently amend sections 800, 794, and 827, Florida Statutes, as
they relate to sexual conduct with a child. If the desired result is
enhanced punishment of sexual offenders who victimize children, the
same net effect could be achieved through the addition of an enhance-
ment provision within the substantive sections of the law.
Without argument, the legislation currently in effect protects chil-
dren from sexual molestation. The characteristic that sets this statute
apart from the substantive section is the modality with which it accom-
plishes this goal. It recognizes that a new frontier is being used to per-
petrate these evils upon our children. The underlying crime, however, is
no different: Sexual exploitation of a child, the crime has not changed,
merely the modality. The creation of a new statute is not the most effi-
cient or jurisprudentially the most effective means to achieve our goal.
This type of response to new perceptions of threat is not new. In
1979, the Florida Legislature passed the Florida Drug Abuse Prevention
Act. 198 In 1993, however, in response to the perceived, although real,
danger to children from the sale of drugs in their proximity, it passed an
amendment to the chapter. 99 This amendment, did not create a brand
new offense, it merely upgraded the already illegal conduct of drug sales
to a higher grade felony when the sales occurred within proximity to a
school. 2°°
In Internet cases, the government must prove an attempt of either
196. Gregg, supra note 170, at 187.
197. See discussion supra Section V (B) (concerning inappropriateness in Anglo-American
law of punishing the equivalent of guilty thoughts).
198. FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (1979).




sexual battery upon a chid,2°1 or attempted lewd acts with a child, or one
of the other enumerated offenses. This being the case, the state can no
longer rely solely upon the conduct on the Internet. It must wait for
further "substantial steps. 2 °2 Clearly, this removes the danger of pun-
ishing guilty thoughts.
Under the proposed change, the state must await the defendant's
overt act. For example, the defendant must arrive at the predetermined
meeting place or another "substantial step" toward the commission of
the crime. Making proof of the crime more removed from the planning
stage, and more closely related to criminal conduct, assuages concerns
expressed previously over the inability to abandon the crime once the
first solicitation has been made.
In accordance with this proposed new format, the jury would pre-
sumably be instructed under the standard instructions concerning solici-
tation where the actor solicited the child, or person whom he believed to
be a child, to commit some sexual act. In this case, the actor may still
avail himself of the defense of abandonment.2 °3 Conversely, the crime,
as currently written, is the mere solicitation itself which connotes that
once the words, or text, have been uttered, the crime is completed, and
may be charged.2°4
This jury instruction allows the defense if the actor otherwise pre-
vented commission of the offense.2 °5 Failure of the defendant to meet
with the undercover agent constitutes just such a prevention.
Alternatively, section 847.0135 could be amended to require a spe-
cific overt act in furtherance of the crime. While some argue that the
mere transmission of E-mail communications is an overt act, it does not
have the same conceptual connotation as its real-world equivalent.
Clearly, an actor who sends a telegram or letter to a co-conspirator
imploring them to commit a substantive act takes an overt step necessary
to create the fear that the crime will be further perpetrated. It is not
altogether as clear, for the reasons stated earlier, that the cyberspace
equivalent does the same thing. The addition, therefore, of the penulti-
mate overt act of meeting with the child, or some equivalently "substan-
tial step," assures that guilty thoughts remain unpunished and that guilty
acts receive the full force and effect of our criminal laws.
201. See FLA. STAT. § 794.11 (1997).
202. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1) (defining attempt as requiring a substantial step in the
course of conduct planned to culminate the commission of the crime); FLA. STAND. CRIM. JURY
INST. Attempt to Commit Crime § 777.04(1). (1998).
203. See FLA STAN. CR. JURY INST. Solicitation.
204. FLA. STAT. § 847.0135(3) (1997).
205. See FLA STAN. CR JURY INST. Solicitation.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Colleagues often ask "Should we expend valuable, finite resources
on this problem that is essentially the creation of crime where none
existed?" The answer is most assuredly in the affirmative, but not with-
out controversy. Society is determined to protect children. It recog-
nizes, as evidenced by the plethora of legislation in that area, that
children are unprepared, or ill-equipped, to protect themselves. When it
becomes apparent, as it does from the literature on pedophilia and sexual
abuse of children, that the danger is real and not perceived, then society
must aggressively, punish those persons who perpetrate offenses against
the helpless. This crime, sexual abuse of children, is such that preven-
tion is the only efficacious solution. The mere reactive approach, a stan-
dard response to crimes of violence and theft, is inadequate and immoral
in this framework. Inadequate in the fact that research is clear that
numerous cases of child sexual abuse remain unreported, and immoral in
that our duty as protectors of children militates an aggressive response to
shield them from harmful, life-altering contacts.
The aggressive attack of Internet child sexual predation remains the
antithesis of the aggressive attack on prostitution sometimes criticized as
"legislation of morality." Prostitution, while illegal, is unquestionably
the commission of an act otherwise legal, and in some societies morally
acceptable, with the interjection of a monetary exchange. Two con-
senting parties enter a business transaction. The abuse of a child by
sexual contact, notwithstanding the arguments of pedophiles, cannot
aspire to consensual behavior. It must be crushed at the very dawn of its
existence, in this case, the solicitation of a child under the fortuitous
occasion that it transpires in cyberspace.
The often articulated argument that police in this situation merely
create crimes where none previously existed, has been attempted under
all circumstances where aggressive, proactive police conduct ensnares
unsuspecting criminals. It does not necessarily follow that because the
police create the opportunity for an otherwise predisposed criminal to
commit his crime that this is "creation" of crime.
In the case of child sexual abuse, this could not be more conspicu-
ous. Both statistical and empirical data reflect the overwhelming fact
that child sex offenders will offend. This cannot reasonably be disputed.
It must then logically follow that police, posing as victims, will intercept
the focus of this behavior before a child is victimized. In essence, for
every police officer the child molester meets, there is one less real vic-
tim to be counseled. Because of the insidious nature of the offender and
the cloak of secrecy within which he operates, there remains no alterna-
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tive but the aggressive preemptive strike that is so effective when admin-
istered sensibly and within the confines of society's sense of justice.
Admittedly, the interjection of cyberspace into this equation adds a
facet of complexity not previously seen. This new frontier, however, is
not the bane of society. Problems exist. One such problem is addressed
here. The ethereal intangibility of the Internet creates a disconjunction
between what people perceive as actions and what they perceive as
thoughts. This disconjunction raises a multitude of questions with
which lawyers, scholars, and judges must inevitably struggle as technol-
ogy speeds along with jurisprudential thought at its heels. It is simulta-
neously a treasure and a treachery. We must, however, reflect on
previous technological advances. Most were received amid the antitheti-
cal cries of obsequious sycophants and iconoclastic doomsayers. The
truth, however, often lay somewhere in the middle. As in the case of all
early technology, the Internet and cyberspace will suffer growing pains.
The growing pains bring with them a cacophony of criticism. As legal
frontiersmen in this vast ether of nothingness, we must balance our fear
of the unknown with our objective sense of right and wrong.
The issues addressed here are a mere splinter of the greater issues
to be addressed. The solution is imperfect. The coexistence of common-
sense and protection of our children, however, is not an unattainable
goal.
If we apply real world principles, such as overt acts and the ability
to abandon an attempt, to crimes occurring somewhere between the
realm of fantasy and action, we can intelligently apply precedent. The
pivotal question becomes at what point in cyberspace do thoughts and
actions merge. Is it the innocuous depression of the "send" button? Is it
that point in which our cyberactions are converted into real actions by
the voluntary execution of a physical act? I find the former much more
troubling than the latter. The combination of the former, Internet com-
munications such as E-mail and chat conversations, with a small amount
of the latter, an overt act done entirely in the real world, can rise to the
level of a "substantial step" and should be the overriding standard by
which our Internet activities are judged.
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